Unknown Songs, Core Songs

Famed rocker Rod Stewart, although commercially successful in the 1970s, lost some of his credibility among rock and roll fans when he pulled on spandex tights and unleashed a string of disco hits. It took several years and a return to his bluesy version of rock to regain his position as a classic rock artist and legendary success.

No band exemplifies the principle of maintaining and improving the core product better, however, than the most successful rock androll brand of all time-the Rolling Stones. The Forty Licks world tour was a masterful extension of the brand to new areas of the globe with new promotions and new merchandise. Fundamentally, though, it was mostly the same songs that were hits 40 years ago, borrowed from the best of Muddy Waters and other blues pioneers. Although the Stones produced several albums most years, usually they were recombinations of core songs with just enough new ones to enlist new listeners and justify the album purchase to existing fans. The bedrock of rock and roll product development is a greatest hits album or a new album salted heavily with tracks fans already know and love.

New products are very risky because 80 percent or more fail, simply because consumers generally don’t change products with which they are satisfied. This principle stands out when studying rock music-fans continue to support the bands they like, the ones that reside on their personal all time favorites lists. Just as new, unknown songs played at concerts, even by legends such as Paul McCartney or Elton John, are likely to be “restroom music” for lots of fans, companies also experience difficulty in getting consumers to accept something new, especially when they stray too far from their core product strength. Volkswagen, after its Aerosmith like resurgence with the Beetle and other midmarket models, entered the luxury car market with the Phaeton-a $70,000 spectacular array of new features including a solar powered sunroof and sensors that control both the temperature and humidity in the car, competing with Mercedes, Lexus, and Cadillac. Instead of maintaining and extending its successful Jetta or Passat brands with a SUV or other adaptations, the Phaeton was supposed to lead Volkswagen out of its middle of the road image into the premium market. By the end of its first year, sales totaled just 3,009 Phaetons, only a quarter of company projections.